自2023年10月，欧盟对华电动汽车发起反补贴调查以来，相关案件进展持续受到行业关注。2026年1月，欧盟委员会正式发布《关于提交价格承诺申请的指导文件》，对企业提交价格承诺申请的核心要求、评估流程和程序细则作出具体规定。为研判案件对中国汽车产业的影响，并协助企业构建有效应对方案，在中国汽车工业协会的组织下，专题研讨会于2026年1月16日在北京丰台顺利召开。

中国汽车工业协会产业研究部总监姜建娜主持会议。商务部及工业和信息化部相关领导应邀出席指导。同时，会议邀请了中国国际经济交流中心、赛迪研究院、大成律师事务所的专家代表参与研讨。国内13家重点整车企业代表共同参与交流与探讨。

大成律师事务所宫仁海博士，对《关于提交价格承诺申请的指导文件》进行专业解读，并结合行业实际，为企业系统梳理了提交价格承诺方案的关键要点与操作流程，助力企业更好地理解和运用相关政策。

与会企业代表围绕价格承诺方案的具体内容，积极提出问题，并结合自身情况发表了意见与建议。现场讨论务实深入，交流氛围热烈。

附件：《关于提交价格承诺报价的指导文件》机翻

一、文件目的与适用范围

本文件旨在为可能就向欧盟出口乘用电池电动汽车（Battery Electric Vehicles，BEVs）提交价格承诺报价（undertaking offers，以下简称 UT 报价）的中国出口商提供指导。目前，该类产品正受到欧盟反补贴措施的约束。

每一项 UT 报价均依据欧盟《基本反补贴条例》（符合 WTO 规则）中规定的相同法律标准进行评估，评估过程坚持客观、公正和非歧视原则。具体而言，UT 报价必须：

足以消除补贴所造成的损害性影响，并产生与征收反补贴税等同的效果；具备可操作性；降低交叉补偿的风险；符合一般政策考量。

通过遵循本指导文件中列明的要点，出口商在考虑可能的价格承诺方案时，可在实践层面结合本案具体情况，识别并应对相关问题。

二、单独提交或联合提交的报价

由单一企业提交的 UT 报价，必须针对该企业自身的具体情况，回应上述评估标准。

如 UT 报价由多家企业联合提交，则该报价必须充分考虑每一家企业的具体情况和差异。

三、产品覆盖范围

出口商可自行决定其 UT 报价所涵盖的产品范围。

向欧盟仅出口一种或少数几种 BEV 车型的企业，在可能的 UT 报价中，其交叉补偿风险相对较低。涵盖所有受措施约束并出口至欧盟产品的 UT 报价，有助于在相关产品范围内限制交叉补偿风险。

同样，不向欧盟同一客户出口其他产品（例如混合动力汽车）的企业，有助于限制与措施适用范围之外产品之间发生交叉补偿的风险。

相反，如果涉及较为广泛的 BEV 车型，或向同一客户出口未受措施约束的其他产品，则会增加发生交叉补偿的风险。

四、最低进口价格（Minimum Import Price，MIP）

最低进口价格（MIP）的设定水平必须足以消除补贴所造成的损害性影响。

鉴于产品在车型、配置选项等方面存在较大差异，并对销售价格产生显著影响，因此需要针对每一车型及配置选项分别设定具体的 MIP。

确定 MIP 可考虑以下两种途径：

以相关出口商在导致采取措施的调查期内的 CIF 出口价格为基础，并在此基础上加上所征收反补贴税的相应幅度；

以欧盟境内同类（或高度相似并就物理差异作出适当调整的）非补贴欧盟生产 BEV 的销售价格为基础，该价格应包含销售、一般及管理费用（SG&A）以及合理的利润水平。

车型和配置选项的多样性越有限，UT 的可操作性越强。

五、年度出口数量

出口商可考虑在 UT 中纳入年度出口数量承诺，作为降低交叉补偿风险的一个要素。同时，该类承诺也有助于强化价格承诺在充分消除补贴损害方面的有效性。

六、有效期限

对 UT 的适用期限加以限制（例如设定固定期限，或与特定车型的生命周期相挂钩），也是在时间维度上降低交叉补偿风险的一种方式。

七、欧盟市场销售价格

本部分涉及向欧盟境内首个独立客户销售时的销售价格。每一笔具体交易的销售价格均须符合相应的 MIP 要求。

如出口产品由与出口商存在关联关系的进口商在欧盟市场转售，则在与 MIP 进行可比性分析时，向首个独立客户的销售价格中应扣除进口清关后发生的所有成本。为此，关联进口商需证明其实际发生的销售、一般及管理费用（SG&A），并提供合理的利润率。

从 UT 可操作性的角度来看，直接向无关联的进口商销售，有助于以更简化的方式确定用于与 MIP 比较的销售价格。销售渠道越复杂，涉及一个或多个关联分销企业，则由于需要进行销售价格扣减，以及对所有相关数据进行持续监测和核查，其可操作性相应降低。

八、销售渠道的复杂性

相对简单的公司结构以及简化的销售渠道组织，有助于大幅简化净销售价格的确定。这对于与 MIP 进行比较是必要条件，同时也有利于监管机构对出口商是否遵守 UT 条款进行监测和核查。

分销组织复杂程度可通过以下因素衡量：

欧盟市场中中介主体的数量；

分销链中中介的存在情况；

分销渠道的多样性（例如线上 B2C 销售、代理销售模式、车队销售等）；

出口商与欧盟境内首个独立客户之间销售链条中所涉及的中介数量。

分销渠道结构越复杂，净销售价格计算越复杂，对可核查文件材料的要求也越高，同时交叉补偿的风险亦显著上升。

九、对未来欧盟投资的承诺

任何关于在欧盟境内对 BEV 相关产业进行投资的承诺，均将作为 UT 报价的一部分予以考虑和评估。

UT 中所包含的投资承诺，必须在投资性质、范围、时间安排及资金规模等方面作出明确界定，并应设定清晰、可核查的阶段性目标。

需要注意的是，如未履行上述投资承诺，可能构成对 UT 的违反，从而导致欧盟撤销对 UT 的接受，并追溯征收相关关税。

十、价格承诺的技术可行性

欧盟委员会必须能够有效地对企业是否遵守 UT 进行监测和核查。在评估是否能够在合理行政成本下实现上述目标时，应考虑以下因素：

产品复杂性：BEV 车型数量以及配置/版本选项数量，是否需要设定多个单独的 MIP；

企业结构；

销售渠道的复杂性；

向同一客户（或与该客户存在关联关系的企业）销售其他产品和/或提供服务的情况；

提交 UT 企业会计系统和业务文件的可获取性与透明度，以便对 UT 条款下所报告信息进行后续核查。

十一、为降低交叉补偿风险作出的进一步承诺

在提交 UT 报价时，应认真评估是否可以承诺采取额外措施，以进一步降低交叉补偿风险。上述措施应与企业的个体风险状况相匹配，并基于前述各项因素加以确定。

此类措施可包括但不限于：

对分销渠道的组织结构进行标准化；

简化现有的经销商销售激励制度；

建立内部流程和文件体系，以支持从出口到最终销售的单车级别跟踪，包括净销售价格后续任何调整或减让；

对上述组织流程（包括 BEV 定价政策）安排独立的外部审计。

十二、程序

向欧盟委员会正式提交 UT 报价，将启动对该报价可接受性和可操作性的评估程序，该评估将以加快方式开展。委员会将向相关方披露其初步评估结果。利益相关方进行评论。在此基础上，委员会将最终决定是否接受该承诺。

若委员会决定接受该承诺，则将形成一份实施决定作为后续措施的依据，并对实施现行措施的法规进行修订。若委员会决定不接受该承诺，则仅需发布一份阐述理由的实施决定。在所有情况下，决策过程均需依据委员会程序规则，由成员国投票表决。

Guidance document on submission of price undertaking offers（原文）

This document is intended to provide guidance to Chinese exporters that may consider price undertaking offers (UT offers) for exports of battery electric vehicles for passengers (BEVs) to the EU, which are currently subject to countervailing duties.

Each UT offer is assessed against the same legal criteria laid down in the EU basic anti-subsidy Regulation according to WTO rules, in an objective and non-discriminatory manner: the UT offer must be adequate to eliminate the injurious effects of the subsidies and provide equivalent effect to duties; be practicable; mitigate the risk of cross-compensation; and be in accordance with general policy considerations.

By following the points outlined in this guidance, exporters can identify and address, in practical terms and customised for this particular case, relevant issues, when considering possible undertaking offers.

I. Individually or jointly submitted offers

UTs submitted by an individual company must address the specific situation of this company in relation the above-mentioned criteria. In case of a UT submitted jointly by several companies, the UT must take into account each individual company’s specifics.

II. Product Coverage

Exporters will decide on the product coverage of their UT offer.

Companies that export to the EU one or few BEV models would present a lower risk of cross-compensation in a possible UT offer. An UT offer covering all products subject to the measures exported to the EU would limit the risk of cross-compensation within the product concerned.

Similarly, companies that do not export any other products (for example hybrid vehicles) to the same customers in the EU would limit the risk of cross compensation with products that are outside the scope of the measures.

On the contrary, a broad range of BEV models, or exports of products not under measures to the same customers, would increase the risk of cross-compensation.

III. Minimum Import Price

The Minimum Import Price (MIP) must be set at a level appropriate to remove the injurious effects of the subsidisation.

Given the large variations of the product (models, configuration options) significantly impacting the sales prices, specific MIPs are required for each model and configuration option.

Two possible pathways to determine the MIP are:

Based on the CIF prices of the exporter in question in the investigation period of the proceeding leading to the imposition of the measures, increased by the relevant margin of the countervailing duties imposed.

Basing the MIP on the non-subsidised EU-produced BEV’s sales price in the Union of the same product type (or closely resembling, appropriately adjusted for physical differences), which includes Selling, General and Administrative expenses (SG&A) and a reasonable margin of profit.

The more limited the variety in models and configuration options, the more practicable the UT.

IV. Annual Volumes

Exporters may decide to include a commitment of an annual volume as an element that could mitigate concerns on the risk of cross-compensation. Also, such a commitment could reinforce the offer aiming at adequately addressing the injurious subsidisation.

V. Validity Period

A limited duration of the application of the UT (e.g. a fixed time or conditional upon the life cycle of a particular model) is a further possibility to mitigate the risk of cross-compensation in time.

VI. Sales Price in the EU

It relates to the sales prices when sold to the first independent customer in the EU. This is the sales price of each individual transaction that must respect the relevant MIP.

If exported products are resold in the EU market by an importer related to the exporter, the sales price to the first independent customer would need to have as a deduction all cost incurred after the import clearance, for the proper comparability to the MIP. To this end, the related importer would be required to demonstrate the actual SG&A and provide a reasonable profit margin.

What follows is that in view of the practicability of an UT offer, direct sales to unrelated importers allow a simpler approach to establishing the sales price for comparison with the MIP. The more complex the sales channels, with one or more related distribution companies, the less practicable, in view of the deductions to the sales prices required, as well as the regular monitoring and verification of all data concerned.

VII. Complexity of Sales Channels

A comparatively simple corporate structure and simple organisation of the sales channels greatly simplifies determining the net sales price. This is required for comparison with the MIP. It also facilitates monitoring and verification of the exporter's compliance with the UT terms.

The degree of complexity of the distribution organisation is measured by factors such as the number of representatives in the Union market, the presence of intermediaries in the distribution chain and the variety of distribution channels (e.g. b2c sales on the internet, agency sales models, fleet sales), as well as the number of intermediaries in the sales chain between the exporter and the first independent customer in the Union.

Complex structures in distribution channels result in increased effort due to more complicated net sales price calculations, as well as the need for verifiable documentation. Additionally, the risk of cross-compensation is significantly higher.

VIII. Commitment on Future EU Investments

Any commitment to invest in the BEV-related industries within the EU will be considered and assessed as part of the UT offer. The investment commitments in the UT must be clearly defined in terms of nature, scope, schedule and financial magnitude. Furthermore, clear, verifiable milestones should be set.

It should be borne in mind that non-compliance with such an investment commitment may constitute a breach of the UT, leading to the withdrawal of the acceptance of the UT and to the retroactive collection of duties.

IX. Technical Feasibility of UT

The Commission must be able to monitor and verify the company's compliance with the UT effectively. When assessing whether this is possible with reasonable administrative effort, the factors to be taken into account include:

Product complexity: number of BEV models and equipment options/trims requiring the setting of individual MIPs;

Company structure;

Sales channel complexity;

Sale of other products and/or rendering of services to the same customer (or companies related to the customer) in the Union;

Accessibility and transparency of the accounting system and business documentation of the company offering the UT for purposes of subsequent verification of information reported under UT terms.

X. Further commitments to mitigate risk of cross-compensation

When submitting a UT offer, careful consideration should be given to whether it is possible to commit to additional measures that mitigate the risk of cross-compensation. These measures should be proportionate to the company's individual risk profile, as determined by the aforementioned circumstances.

Such measures may include:

Standardising the organisation of distribution channels;

Simplifying an existing system of sales incentives for distributors;

Creating internal workflows and documentation schemes to facilitate vehicle-specific tracking from export to sale, including any subsequent reductions in the net sales price;

Arranging for external audit of the above-mentioned organisational processes, including BEV pricing policy.

XI. Process

The submission of a formal UT offer to the Commission triggers a procedure for the assessment of the acceptability and practicability of the offer, which will be carried out expeditiously. The Commission will disclose its preliminary assessment to the interested parties for comments. On this basis, the Commission will conclude on the acceptance or not of the offer.

If the Commission decides to accept the UT offer, there would be an Implementing Decision that forms the basis for the conclusion, and an amendment of the regulation imposing the existing measures. If the Commission decides not to accept the UT, there would only be an Implementing Decision stating the reasons. In all cases, the decision making involves the voting of Member States according to comitology rules.